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PROCESSES OF SOIL DEGRADATION AND DETERIORATION: 
AN ECONOMICS POINT OF VIEW 
I nt!roduct ion 
Unlike the physical sciences, agricultural economics deals 
with human behavior and, consequently, might be considered by 
some to be less scientific than the other disciplines in agr{cul-
tune. However, economics is important because agricultural 
~ctivities are ultimately concerned with human welfare, and 
economics alone attempts to measure changes in individual and 
societal welfares. For example, research aimed at finding varieties 
of wheat with higher yields (e.g., HY320) cannot be justified 
unless the net aggregated <social) benefits of the higher yields 
exceed the research costs. How are these benefits to be measured? 
Unfortunately, welfare measurement, or determination of the 
§.9.£.;L-:::1.l bene-Fits. and costs, is not only dif-ficult from a conceptual 
and empirical standpoint, but it is also an ethically-loaded 
p1~oposi t ion. Yet, without a measure of social welfare, it is 
not possible to determine if policies such as research to develop 
a higher yielding variety of wheat <or use of public funds to 
retain a particular rail branch line) are worthwhile undertaking. 
It is the contention in this paper that economics deals 
with issues from a social, not an individual, point of view. 
Therefore, economists are primarily concerned with the impacts 
of agricultural activities on society, not just farmers as indiv-
iduals. This does not imply that individuals are unimportant; 
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ra.ther, it implies th&.t it is necessary to take into account 
interactions among individuals. In particular, it is necessary 
to recognize how actions by individuals in one sector of the 
economy (e.g., agriculture) affect those in other sectors, and 
vice \lersa. 1 Finally, the social costs and benefits may need 
to be suitably modified to take into account equity considerations. 
The economics' view of processes of soil deg1~ ad at ion and 
deteri ot~ati on is presented in this paper. In the next section, 
soil conservation and soil clepletion (degradation and deterioration) 
are defined in an economic sense. This is followed by a discussion 
of the individual attitude toward soil conservation and depletion. 
Then it is argued that there is a divergence between the socially 
and privately optimal rates of soil conservation. This divergence 
is considered to be a r~tionale for public intervention in private 
decision-making. Finally, intervention mechanisms are briefly 
consider-ed. 
Definit:i.oris of Soil Conservation a.nd DeQJ..etion 
Gafney (1965) has argued that any meaningful vi evJ of land 
must encompass both a Ricardian and a capital component. The 
Ricardian component is the perdurable. permanent and indestructible 
1 Perhaps this explains why, in the past few years, there has 
been a diffusion of agricultural policy making, primarily at 
the e;-;pense o-f {igriculture Ca.nada (see Brinkman 1983). For 
~xample, agricultural freight rates and the branch line rehab-
ilitation program are administered by Transport Canada, the 
Wheat Board has its own ministry, and the Western Grain Stabilization 
Act -falls under Industry, Trade and Commerce. 
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c ornp on F:.'n t o-f the land (soil) matrix which includes such factors 
as location, climate, drainage, and i ne;: hau.st i b 1 E0 
C<::l.pi t:a.l component of 
th£0 soi.l m.:::~t.r·i:·~ cons;i.st.~::; of the· ''conset··vc-:\blr::~ ·flov·~··, thr~ ''r-~?volving 
The conservable flow element 
th<:'!.t •··.Jhich tc:\kf:?S somt: ..~ p<0.ir1 (i.e., expense or investment) 
to maintain in its original state. is ~"-JC)r .. th 
expenditures because t:he~'l l E~SS than the present value of 
the future income derived from this particular el ernent the 
Tl1 \'2 on the other hand, is that 
component of the soil matrix which is not economical to C C)f"i S:·E'I'"' \/E.~ 
but i :; to replace or renew with materials imported 
..f= !' .. Clffl Df ·f ·s:i. tF2. Finally, when land is f i I'" :::.t: 
ffi! . ..!.C:h in the soil that the farmer views it as 
E:l. ·f , .. eE• 'J OC!d. lh1.s 1s an example of ::;u.t··plu-::. and 
there is no reason for the farmer to ever conserve this component 
o+ the soil matrix. It is-included as a capital componE~r1t only 
because it is a finite stock. Once depleted, or nearly depleted, 
1t can be treated the same as either 
revolving fund component of the soil matrix. 
c omp on •:?n t:. 1 a.nc:l is neither conservable 
nor depletable and, therefore, it is not to 
refer when they speak of soil depletion 
Rather, it is the c::a.p i t<.=..l component? n i:\iTlf.? .1. y? 
the conservable flow and revolving fund components. 
i::\(]1~ i. cu.l t u.r· al frequently are unable to adequately dis-
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tinguish between those elements which are properly a part of 
ccnservable flow and those which constitute the revolving fund. 
The reason fer this is twofold. Fi r·st, there may be a lack 
of knowledge regarding soil physiology and the effects of chemical 
additives on conservation and soil 
problem may be one of economic incentives, particularly problems 
due to vagaries in economic parameters such. as the interest 
rate and output prices. 
Thr·ee def :i. nit i ems of conservation-. cc:m nov·-! be i dent: if i eel. 
Gaffney defines conservation as the 
devoted to reduce the loss of virgin flow resources that may 
bi.;:.), but n<-~!:?.d not be, dt;?tf.=r·iorc:-..tr:?.c:! b'/ use:~·· (p. 546). Fo1~ e:< a.mp 1 e, 
contour plowing on steep slopes m~y require more effort (e.q., 
operator time), but it does reduc~ water erosion of the soil. 
(2) Ciriacy-Watrup (1968) defines conservation as a redistri-
bution of use rates into the future, while depletion is a redist-
ribution of use rates to the present. Notice that this definition 
requires some benchmark distr·ibuti.on o-f and that 
benchmark may not be an easy thing to obtain a consensus about. 
[!.J it h i: his d e·f in it ion ~ '' c: on ser· vi n~~ a•:;)r-· i cult ur· i:il l <:\n d oc: c u1r· s v-Jh E?n t::'Vf.=i·-
the soil is depleted more slowly or converted into other uses 
less r·c.;pidly" <Hedlin and Kraft 1985~ p. ll) th~~.n c:ur·t~f2ntly. 
It is implicitly assumed? therefore~ that soil 
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deterioration are inevitable, unlike in the first definition. 2 
(3) In more common parlance, soil conservation is seen 
as any action which prevents a deterioration of the soil beyond 
some critical point where irreversibilities set in. 3 That is, 
conservation is the avoiding of an irreversible loss, irreversible, 
"not because the soil cannot be rebuilt, but because it can 
never be rebuilt so cheaply as the cost of conserving the virgin 
soil" <Gaffney, p. 546). Let us illustrate what we mean by 
-irreversibilities and conservation with an example. As the 
settlers moved into the Western United States, into the territory 
now known as eastern Washington, eastern Oregon, Idaho, Colorado, 
Utah and Nevada, they grazed their cattle on the long grasses 
which covered that semi-arid land. The land was treated as 
a ~ammon property resource and was quickly over-grazed; irreversib-
ilities set in and sagebrush replaced the once abundant grasses. 
Al'though studies have indicated that it is possible to return 
to the earlier plant ecology, the costs of doing so far exceed 
the benefif.s <Stevens and Godfrey 1972). Had conservation been 
practiced to begin with, the discounted value of the stream 
of profits would have greatly exceeded the net benefits which 
resulted from the liquidation of this con~ervable flow. 
2 In general, this definition is applied to a stock or non-renewable 
resource and not to a renewable resource. Sbil is considered 
a renewable resourc~, due primarily ~o the conservable flow 
ccHnponent. 
3 Ci r.i acy-Wantrup uses the tenn "safe mini mum standard" to identify 
the point beyond which irreversibiliti~s are probable. 
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Farmer Behavior Toward Soil Conservation and Land Degradation 
Farmers are faced with a number of economic choices in 
their everyday production decisions, and many of these impact 
on soil conservation. 
to cultivate their 
For example, they have to decide how 
land, which crops to plant, what inputs to 
use, and when to sell the product. The constraints they face 
can be divided into three broad categories: 
(1) Technological constraints are considered to be soil quality, 
seed quality, available machinery technology, and information 
on when and how to plant, when and how to harvest, and 
so on. 
(2) Economic constraints include the prices of products and 
inputs, and time preference. 
(3) Institution~! constraints include ~oning regulations and 
the underlying political infrastructure (e.g., trade and 
transportation regulations), although some of ·these may 
properly be included as economic constraints. 
Within these constraints the farmer must Choose how to use his 
land; he must decide how much soil 
and how much degradation to allow. 
conservation to practice 
Farmers must make what economists refer to as a normal 
economic profit if they are to remain in business. Profit is 
generally considered to be the difference between total revenue 
and total cost. Included in total cost is the opportu~ity cost 
of employing a resource in its best alternative use. In farming, 
some inputs, such as family labour, management and soil depletion, 
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are not included as a part of total cost although they should 
be. If these costs are taken into proper account, then farm 
operators must earn a return at least as great as what they 
could earn if they invested their capital elsewhere. 
is normal profit. Given the long-te~m trend toward 
This return 
lower ~o--Jheat 
prices, 
a normal 
farmers have often stayed in business--that is, earned 
profit--by allowing the conservable flow component 
of the soil to deteriorate over time. 
Is ib beneficial from the individual's point of view to 
allow soil depletion by drawing down soil capital? The ansv'ler 
First, there from an economic viewpoint is yes on two accounts. 
may be some surplus that can be captured by the individual that 
will h~ve no impact on current or future yields <i.e., expendable 
surplus). Second, since farmers must make a profit today and 
the future is discounted, they will pursue short-term gains 
rather than long-term conservation goals. 
Farmers' decisions regarding the farm enterprise and, in 
par·ti cul ar, conservation practices are influenced by economic 
pa.ram€;!t(·?rs. Consider first the impact of interest rates on 
farmers' decisions. Suppose a farmer is concerned about soil 
erosion and land degradation because these will reduce future 
yie:,lds. Conservation measures require a present sacrifice 1 
usually financial, in order that a future benefit may be realized. 
In this case, the benefit is the prevention of soil productivity 
losses. Suppose such a benefit accrues ten years in the future 
and is worth $1,000 at that time. How much is the farmer willing 
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to pay today so that he can get at least as must as he would 
if he put that sum of money (i.e., the amount needed to prevent 
soil deterioration) in the bank? That depends on the interest 
rate as indicated in the following table: 
Interest 
01. 
5/. 
10/. 
20% 
Amount Farmer is Currently 
Willing to Pay to Prevent 
Soil Depletion 
$1,000 
610 
390 
160 
Obviously, the lower the interest rate, the more that ~he farmer 
is willing to pay for conservation. Given the high· interest 
rates (and low commodity prices) experienced in the recent past, 
it is little wonder that farmers are not concerned with conservation 
to tha degree that some would like, including perhaps themselves; 
Soil Conservation: Externalitv in Agriculture 
A question which needs to be addressed is: Why should 
society be concerned about an individual's conservation practices 
on his own farm? Economists argue that private decisions in 
agriculture may not always be in the best interests of society. 
Several views are relevant here. Three attitudes which are 
in the neoclassical economics tradition and provide a rationale 
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for government intervention are considered. 4 However, the third 
attitude may be considered invalid, although it can be rendered 
valid by adopting an alternative (and valid) perspective of 
economics. 
First, ownership externalities occur when the activities 
of one economic agent affect the profits or utility of anothe~ 
agent, but these external effects are not taken into account 
by the first agent in making his production .or consumption deci-
sions. Environmental- pollution is an e~<ample of this type of 
externality; in agriculture, the factors which lead to land 
degradation also result in air and water pollution (e.g., wind 
and water erosion, and chemical pollutants entering water systems). 
Government i nterv.enti on is often required in these si tuati ens 
to get economic agents to take into account the costs of their 
decisions on others. 
Second, since the future is uncertain and an individual's 
life is finite, individuals may discount the future at a ·higher 
rate than society. As noted in the previous· section, a higher 
di SCOLtnt rate implies less interest in conservation. 
Since society likely views risks differently than the individual, 
society likely uses a lower discount rate in valuing the benefits 
of conservation. If this is true, the socially optimal rate 
of conservation diverges from the priv~tely ~ptimal rate, and 
government intervention is r~quired to get private decision-ma~e~s 
4 That government has the right to intervene in private 
pertaining to the use of land is established in law. 
(1965) for a brief history of law in this area. 
53 
decisions. 
See Hecht 
to make choices in line with those preferred by society. 
A third rationale for government intervention in private 
decisions is the public goods argument. A public goods externality 
occurs in the provision of open spaces, such as meadows and 
parks, and in ensuring the long-term sustainability of agricultural 
production. However, the latter argument is often invoked by 
those who are really interested in open space. As Hedlin and 
Kraft (1985) argue, there does not seem to be any impediment 
to maintaining high levels of agricultural output in Canada 
indefinitely. It is also unlikely that lack of open space is 
a problem in Western Canada. Hence, this argument for government 
intervention may not be a valid one. 
The public goods argument retains its validity, however,. 
i~ it is couched in an institutional economics, eco-philosophic 
framework. While few doubt the efficiency of the market, the 
market may be unable to deal with problems of environmental 
management and the intertemporal allocation of natural resources. 
Three positions can be adopted with respect to the environment. 
The first is the Jainist position of absolute nonviolence and 
noninterference which is evident in some ecological movements 
(e.g., Greenpeace). Second is the attitude of coevolutionary 
development which ''contends that human welfare and tenure on 
earth depends on the maintenance of a harmonious relationship 
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with the natural world" <Norgaard 1984, p.169).e Finally, one 
can adopt the position that man can transcend his environment 
and overcome any ecological problem with science and technology, 
whether the required technology currently exists or not. 
Only the second position is considered valid in this ~aper. 
Since agricultural production provides a link between man and 
na.ture, many soil scientists and agronomists <e.g., Grant 1979, 
and Buttel and Gertler 1982) argue that society has a stake 
in the agronomic practices o~ the individual farmer. Hence, 
it can be argued that this view of farming considers agricultural 
production, including production of environmental "bads", to 
have public good characteristics. 
Each of the above resu~ts in a divergence between the privately 
6ptimal rate of land or soil· conservation and the socially optimal 
level of conservation. In this case, private decisions may 
be altered so that private actions are in accord with social 
desires and goals. This is the case because society may obtain 
a benefit, over and above the private gains to farmers, from 
soil conservation and from soil debasement prevention. The 
economics literature suggests a variety of economic and instit-
utional incentives for bringing p1~ i vate actions in 1 . ... 1ne with 
social desires. Fo1~ e;-: ample, the government could regulate 
the size of machines that could be purchased if soil compaction 
5 Coevolutionary development is a coevolutionary process--a positive 
feedback in the cybernetic sense--that benefits man <Norgaard 
1984, p.161). The concept of coevolutionary development is 
similar to that of stewardship. 
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was felt to be a major problem. Regulations regarding the use 
(6r, perhaps, abuse> of fertilizers and other chemicals could 
be instituted. If heavy debt loads were perceived to be the 
problem, as suggested by Grant <p. 51>, and by Buttell and Gertler 
<p. 111), financial and management counselling could be provided 
free of charge by the governmemt, or subsidized farm mortgage 
rates could be made available. Some of these recommendations 
are already in· place in one form or another, as well as others 
which have not been mentioned. 
Economists, however, tend to shun such direct ~ethods of 
intervention since they regard them as an additional source 
of inefficiency. Further, the benefits from subsidy-type programs 
frequently become capitalized in the values of fixed assets 
such as l~nd and, therefore, do not ameliorat~ the problem the 
program seeks to address. Economic incentives, such as ta:·: 
incentives for farmers who implement particular conservation 
measures and charges on undesirable runoff into waterways, are 
preferred as methods of modifying individual behaviour. That 
is, it is preferable to incorporate the public loss as a direct 
cost in the producer's decision calculus. 
While we might agree that public intervention in agriculture 
is desirable, and the preponderance of government agricultural 
programs seems to support this notion, it should be evident 
that the determination of an optimal distribution of use rates 
lies with society, and is therefore beyond the purview of a 
single discipline. Indeed, we land right in the middle of an 
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enduring debate about social choice, and whose opinions are 
to be counted in decisionmaking and ho~. 
However, these traditional economic solutions may not address 
the problem of coevolutionary development potential. In order 
to adequately address the problem of stewardship, of man's relat-
ionship with his environment, government intervention may not 
by itself be appropriate. Rather, it is necessary to change 
the attitude of individuals toward the environment. Perhaps 
this requires education to make membe~s of society aware of 
how their consumption, and the production techniques used in 
industry (including agriculture), adversely impact on the environ-
ment. It behooves scientists concerned with the production 
of food to work together in the study pf this important problem. 
The first step in such a process· is to take a broad look at 
our resource base and to decide how we are going to evaluate 
society goals and human needs. 
Summarv. 
Farmers will use the soil so as to maximize their own welfare. 
Since the future is uncertain, income in later periods is worth 
less than current income. Hence, the individual decisionmaker, 
the individual farmer, will likely deplete the soil at a rate 
incommensurable with society's preferences. If it can be argued 
that agricultural land is a public good--i.~., that private 
decisions result in a divergence between the socially and privately 
optimal rates of soil conservation--then there is a rationale 
57 
for public intervention. Merely to demonstrate that private 
decisions reqarding process of soil deterioration and degradation 
result in social inefficiencies may not, however, be an adequate 
justification for public intervention. It needs to be further 
demonstrated that government action will result in a "better" 
outcome; that is, that government intervention will indeed move 
society closer to its desired levels of conservation. 
As mentioned, the social optimal toward which we focus 
our sights may be illusive. Unfortunately, economists are sometimes 
perceived as villains who seek to undermine the ethically-derived 
policies of their colleagues in the physical sciences. However, 
this is a misconception. Economists are as concerned about 
soil conservation and land degradataion as the soil scientists. 
But they are alsQrelu~tant to substitute one evil 
soil depletion) with another, namely, wasteful government inter-
vent ion. 
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